Maldives Trade Monopolies and the Cartaz System During the Reign of Sultan al-Sharif Ahmad al-Makki in Afonso de Albuquerque’s October 1512 Letter.

A Portuguese Nau ship, with its distinctive sails, anchored in the tranquil lagoon of the Maldives, surrounded by lush palm trees and clear skies.

In his October 1512 letter to King Manuel I of Portugal (1469–1521) (dated around 11 October, likely written from Cannanore or aboard ship off the Malabar Coast), Afonso de Albuquerque, Viceroy of Portuguese India, highlighted the Maldives as a critical vulnerability in the emerging Portuguese trade monopoly across the Indian Ocean. This dispatch was written during the brief but significant reign of Sultan al-Sharif Ahmad al-Makki (also known as Sharif Ahmed of Mecca or Sultan al-Sharif Ahmad al-Makki), titled Suddha Bavana, who ruled the Maldives from 1511 to 1513. As an Arab ruler from Mecca , possibly a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad , Sultan al-Sharif embodied the strong Islamic and pan-Muslim connections that Portuguese officials sought to disrupt.

This period of political instability was further complicated by the role of the deposed Sultan Kalu Muhammad (Kalu Muhammad Hilali, also known as Dhammaru Bavana), a long-reigning figure (with multiple terms between 1491 and 1528) who had been ousted in 1510 by his nephew Hasan VII. Kalu Muhammad actively sought external support to regain power, appealing to both the Portuguese and the Ali Raja of Cannanore. His efforts created opportunities for Portuguese intervention and highlighted the fractured Maldivian political landscape that Albuquerque sought to exploit.

This short but pragmatic letter built directly on Albuquerque’s April 1512 correspondence. It formed part of his broader strategic vision for the Estado da Índia, in which the Maldives were seen not as a peripheral archipelago but as a potential breach in the carefully constructed system of maritime control.

The Cartaz System: Cornerstone of Portuguese Maritime Dominance

The cartaz (from the Arabic qirtas, meaning “paper” or “document”) was a naval trading license or safe-conduct pass introduced around 1502 under King Manuel I. It became the cornerstone of Portuguese maritime policy in the Indian Ocean.

Key features included:

• Mandatory licensing: Every ship, especially those operated by Muslim (“Moorish”) merchants, had to obtain a cartaz from a Portuguese authority in ports such as Goa, Cochin, or Cannanore. The document specified the vessel’s route, cargo, crew, and destination.

• Obligations: Licensed ships were required to call at Portuguese-controlled ports to pay customs duties (alfândega) and conduct trade through official Portuguese factors (feitores).

• Enforcement: Portuguese patrols could seize, confiscate cargo from, or destroy unlicensed vessels. This targeted the long-established Muslim trading networks from Gujarat, the Red Sea, Arabia, and Southeast Asia.

• Economic and strategic purpose: The cartaz enforced a mare clausum (“closed sea”) policy. It redirected profits toward Portugal, funded naval operations and garrisons, and aimed to break the pre-1498 dominance of Muslim merchants in the spice, textile, and luxury goods trades.

Albuquerque was one of the system’s strongest advocates. After his conquests of Goa (1510) and Malacca (1511), he aggressively expanded the network of fortified ports controlling key chokepoints.

The Maldives as a “Potential Leak” During Sultan al-Sharif Ahmad al-Makki’s Reign (1511–1513)

Albuquerque viewed the Maldives as a strategic weak point, especially under a ruler with deep ties to Mecca and the wider Muslim world, amid the power struggles involving the deposed Kalu Muhammad:

• Geographic advantage for evasion: The archipelago straddled major sea routes between the Malabar Coast, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and the wider Indian Ocean. Its atolls provided sheltered anchorages, fresh water, coconuts, dried fish, and resupply points, allowing ships to detour around Portuguese patrols.

• Muslim (“Moorish”) trade networks: Under Sultan al-Sharif Ahmad al-Makki, Maldivian merchants maintained strong connections with Muslim traders from Gujarat, the Swahili coast, Arabia, and beyond. These networks traded freely in high-value exports , cowries (used as currency across Africa and Asia), coir (coconut fiber for ropes), ambergris, tortoiseshell, and other marine products , without Portuguese oversight. Unlicensed vessels could load cargo in the Maldives and bypass customs at Cochin or Goa.

Undermining high-value monopolies: The islands offered an alternative route for Muslim ships seeking to avoid Portuguese licensing requirements and monopolies on spices, textiles, and horses. Albuquerque feared this would reduce customs revenue and weaken control over the spice route to Europe.

Coir rope intricately wrapped around a bollard on a traditional Maldivian boat, set against the backdrop of the crystal-clear ocean.

The deposed Sultan Kalu Muhammad’s appeals for Portuguese (and Cannanore) support during this period added another layer: Portuguese officials saw opportunities to back him as a more compliant vassal who could help enforce the cartaz system and tribute payments in exchange for assistance in regaining the throne.

In the October 1512 letter, Albuquerque framed the Maldives as part of a larger interconnected maritime system. He recommended practical measures to close the loophole: securing regular tribute (páreas) from local rulers, forging alliances (particularly with the Ali Raja of Cannanore), and increasing naval oversight. His goal was to integrate the islands into the Portuguese tribute and licensing network rather than launch an immediate large-scale conquest (which escalated in the 1550s)

This approach exemplified Albuquerque’s pragmatic imperialism: achieving maximum commercial and strategic gain with limited resources through forts, alliances, tribute systems, and enforced monopolies.

Broader Significance

Albuquerque’s concerns in 1512, during the reign of Sultan al-Sharif Ahmad al-Makki and the ongoing intrigues involving the deposed Kalu Muhammad, proved prescient. The Maldives became a repeated flashpoint in Portuguese–Muslim rivalries throughout the 16th century. Portuguese interventions intensified as they sought to enforce the cartaz system and extract cowries and coir. His letters helped shape early policy, influencing later observers such as Duarte Barbosa (whose 1518 account described the islands) and chroniclers like João de Barros.

The cartaz system was both innovative and deeply resented. While it generated revenue and funded Portugal’s Asian empire, it provoked widespread resistance. This contributed to long-term conflicts across the Indian Ocean, including in the Maldives, where dynastic instability and strong Muslim identity fueled opposition.

The full translated text of Albuquerque’s October 1512 letter appears in Chandra R. de Silva’s Portuguese Encounters with Sri Lanka and the Maldives (2009, pp. 191–192). Together with the April 1512 letter, these documents provide a rare glimpse into Portuguese strategic thinking during this turbulent period of Maldivian politics

In essence, Albuquerque’s October 1512 dispatch reveals how the Maldives, under an Arab sultan with Meccan connections and amid power struggles with figures like the deposed Kalu Muhammad, became central to Portugal’s grand design for Indian Ocean dominance. The archipelago’s valuable resources, strategic location, and Islamic networks represented both opportunity and threat , a classic illustration of how geography, trade, religion, and empire intersected in the early 16th century.